Every Social System Is an Automation by Kohler, Eckehart
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of 
Sciences and Affiliated Societies Nebraska Academy of Sciences 
1973 
Every Social System Is an Automation 
Eckehart Kohler 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas 
Kohler, Eckehart, "Every Social System Is an Automation" (1973). Transactions of the Nebraska Academy 
of Sciences and Affiliated Societies. 381. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas/381 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Nebraska Academy of Sciences at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Transactions of the 
Nebraska Academy of Sciences and Affiliated Societies by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NEBRASKA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
EVERY SOCIAL SYSTEM IS AN AUTOMATION 
Eckehart K'ohler 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
The Purpose of this paper is to apply a branch of mathematics which has 
recently come to the fore in investigations in the social sciences, namely 
automata theory. This application will show how automata theory may be 
used in the formal description of a wide variety of social phenomena. 
My basic plan will be to start by describing a broad class of social system~ 
in terms of game-theoretical notions, especially the notions of strategy and 
strategy mixture. Then I will define automata and show how, under a certain 
translation of terms, every social system of the class I have taken turns out to 
be an automaton. 
Let us first introduce certain notions of game theory: we take a certain 
set of external states G~ which are potentially relevant to the behavior of any 
participant in a social system at any time t, where m is the number of such 
states. We will consider the set of states to contain a record of all past 
behavior of all participants in the social system, so that any particular 
participant can consider this in making his future decisions. We let In be the 
set of n participants and Si the strategy set of the ith participant. The strategy 
set includes all possible actions that a participant might undertake under the 
various circumstances he might observe to hold and which are elements of the 
set G~ of external states. 
Now as is well known, in many social situations, it is preferable to 
randomize one's choice of actions so as not to let those with whom one might 
be in competition be able to predict perfectly one's own actions, since the 
opponents might then take advantage of their perfect knowledge. If, for 
example, a batter in a baseball game knew exactly what sequence of curves 
and fastballs a pitcher were going to throw, he would certainly raise his 
batting average. Now the problem of randomizing strategies involves the 
introduction of probability in order to at least describe the proportion of the 
kinds of actions one chooses, even if their exact sequences be random. Even 
though an observer could not predict any individual actions the participant 
might undertake, he would still know their proportions and therefore the 
probability that any particular action will be undertaken. The set of 
probabilities describing the actions of participant i is called a strategy mixture 
and is designated by 'af,t" which is a function of external state or 
circumstance k and time t. 
At this point we consider an important property of the class of social 
systems we wish to analyze in this paper. This property is descriptive of those 
systems whose behavior has a certain minimal stability. This stability is such 
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that all participants in the social system develop certain fixed strategy 
mixtures which they then retain during the rest of their participation in the 
social system. We assume that the participants, depending on their personali-
ties, begin their participation with a predisposition towards certain mixtures, 
which are then changed to new mixtures according to information received in 
the course of participation and according to other inherent predispositions. 
Looked at formally, this means we may ascribe to each participant i a 
transition probability for each strategy mixture uf,t that i will accept it, 
based on his observation of a prior state of the world, viz. a member of G~ I. 
and his former acceptance of another strategy mixture of, t- I. 
It should be mentioned here that the question of stability plays a central 
role in game-theoretical and decision-theoretical investigations. The approach 
usually taken in this regard is to apply the notion of dominance to see if a 
social system defined by the values held by its participants tends to develop 
stability. The simplest case to investigate is the one where it can be calculated 
that one strategy dominates all others, and we are also sure that it will 
eventually be chosen. Other cases are more complicated, e.g. where 
dominance holds for given strategies only among restricted subsets of the 
entire set of strategies. I cannot go more deeply into these issues here, but 
refer those interested in this problem to standard works, such as those of 
Luce and Raiffa (1) and Fishburn (2). It suffices for the discussion at hand to 
assume that stability exists for the class of social systems we are treating here 
and to see what consequences this has in a more formal way. 
Let us now recapitulate in a list the concepts we have been discussing: 
G~ set of m possible external states at time t, including a record of payoffs 
for all strategies used by participants prior to t 
In set of n participants in the social system 
Si strategy set of ith participant 
of,t m·n strategy mixtures at time t, viz. a probability for each participant i 
and state k for each strategy si h € Si such that 
, 
of,t (si,h) ~ 0 and ~ of,t (Si,h) = I 
pf,t m·n transition probabilities from G~ X {uf'J to fr,t+ ~ 
Using the concepts discussed above, we can now define stability of a 
social system as occurring whenever all participants in that system, after a 
preliminary period of adjustment, settle down on a single strategy mixture. 
Formally, this may be defined as follows: if we let F be the set of stable 
strategy mixtures, it will have the following property: 
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cf,t c F 
i iffdf 3t' Vt"(t" > t' ---"'" k,t"( kIt) 1) -."... Pi O"i - • 
Now it will be my purpose to show that stable social systems as 
characterized above are probabilistic automata (3). To do this, I define 
probabilistic automata, and then we examine the stable social systems to see 
if they have the defining properties of probabilistic automata. These are 
defined as follows. Basically, an automaton is any process which begins in 
some state, is stimulated by an input and thereupon enters into a new state. 
The rule which governs its changes of state is given by a transition function 
M. Furthermore, an automaton is defined by the initial state it is in (because 
being in one rather than another initial state may prevent it from ever going 
into some states); and the automaton is defined by a set F of final states, 
which may be called its "goal states." Formally, we define probabilistic 
automata (where the transitions given by M are not onto definite states, but 
only onto probabilities of states, which is approp;iat~ where transitions are 
indeterministic) as follows: a = (E, A, M, aO F) is a probabilistic automaton 
iffdf 
- = ~o,···,~p is the set of (elementary) inputs 
A = aO, .. " aq is the set of (internal) states 
M is a transition function onto probabilities, from A X E onto [0,1] q+l 
(this is a q+l matrix), such that for any pair (a,n fAX E; 
M(a,n = (PO(a,n,.·., Pq(a,m, and Ph(a,n ;;. 0 and ~ Ph(a,~) = I 
aO is the initial (internal) state of a 
F is the set of final states 
Let us see how the stable social systems may be understood as automata. 
Perhaps the basic step is to determine what in the social system is to be taken 
as its internal state. As a preliminary step, we might consider the case of a 
single participant. Clearly, the state of the individual participant which 
interests us is whichever strategy mixture he has chosen for his actions; and 
the external stimulus which guides his actions is the state Sk f Gm which 
holds at that time. We may assume that Gm is the same for everyone, and 
that in particular, the past actions of other participants is public knowledge 
for all participants. Everyone acts on the same knowledge about external 
events, and hence the external state Sk can be taken as the input for the 
social system as a whole. But what about the internal state of the social 
system? This is determined by the internal states of all the participants, and 
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hence may be taken as the n-tuple of alI n participants' strategy mixtures at 
any time, viz. (af,t , ... , a~,t). The set of all these n-tuples corresponds to the 
set A of internal states of the automation. The set Gm corresponds to the set 
::: of external inputs. The individual probability functions pf,t do not 
correspond directly to the transition function M because the latter yields 
probabilities of internal states of the automaton, whereas the former is a 
probability function merely of an individual participant's internal state. What 
we need is a probability of the n-tuple of strategy mixtures which is the 
internal state of the social system: this is what we are interpreting as the 
automaton, and not the individual participant. For this purpose, a new 
probability function is introduced, pk,t, which is determined by the pf,t,s, 
and is a function of (af,t , ... , a~,t). The set of alI these new P functions 
corresponds to the domam of the automaton's transition function M, so that 
we have the following situation: for every n-tuple of strategy mixtures which 
hold for the social system at any time t and for every state of the world, that 
is, for every (ak,t , ... , a~,t) and Sk, there is a uniquely determined 
pk,t( at 1 , ... , a~+ 1). This is in accord with the characterization of stable -social 
systems as given above. 
Two concepts remain for the interpretation of the social system as 
automata: the initial and final states. The final states of the automaton 
clearly correspond to the set F of stable strategy mixtures. The initial states 
simply correspond to the n-tuple of strategy mixtures to which the 
participants are predisposed at the very beginning of their participation, 
however these are determined: whether by chance or by inherited instinct or 
by learning from previous participations in other social systems. 
The upshot of our investigation may be set down in the following list, 
which gives the automaton-interpretation of our social systems which we had 
been looking for: 
Probabilistic Automaton 
A = [ao, ... , aql 
2: = [~O'···' ~pl 
M 
F 
Stable Social System 
[(a~ ,0, ... , a,;'O) , ... , (af,tq, ... , a~,tq)l 
Gm = [SI , ... , Sml 
[pI ,0, ... , pm,tql 
F 
° ° (a I'···' an) 
My conclusion is that the interpretation of stable social systems as 
automata succeeds, because it has been shown that they satisfy all the formal 
defining conditions of automata. It may be meutioned that there are other 
ways to interpret social systems as automata, such as a way developed by 
Werner Leinfellner. This approach views social systems more from the point 
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of view of value theory for an individual, and the system is analyzed as a 
participant playing against the rest of the social system; his strategies are the 
internal states, the strategy n - I-tuples of the rest of the system are the 
external states, and the transition functional domain consists of evaluations 
the individual makes knowing his previous strategy mixture and the strategy 
mixtures of the other participants. 
The principle outcome of this paper is to show how a new and fruitful 
mathematical technique may be applied to the analysis of social systems. It is 
not to present any particular social facts, but rather a way to come by them 
in the future. 
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